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 Chapter 1 
 
Macroeconomic Uncertainty and the Brazilian Industry 
 
 
Nobuaki Hamaguchi 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Uncertainty and vulnerability to volatile external factors are becoming major 
issues of the current discussion on development prospects of Latin American economy  
(ECLAC, 2002).  In fact, vulnerability has been an old theme for the region since the 
“Manifesto” by Raul Prebisch (1962), although it has been discussed in different means 
in different context1.  The case in point now is the volatility of international capital flow 
to emerging markets. While internationally concerted efforts are needed to control a 
fluctuation, each net debtor country’s active undertakings to build robustness should be 
highly beneficial.    
Yet, it is still puzzling to workout reduce the vulnerability.  Theories of 
aggregate investment alert that if we take an irreversibility of investment and imperfect 
competition into consideration, uncertainty should reduce investment (Caballero and 
Pindyck 1996).  Because of irreversibility it is costly to undo an investment in bad times, 
then firms facing high degree of uncertainty discount cash flow obtainable from the 
project.  For a good time, in turn, although the demand may expand for an industry as a 
whole, a firm under imperfect competition facing a downward sloping demand curve 
expects new entries truncating the demand for this firm.  Thus, even a symmetric 
uncertainty will discourage investment. 
Brazilian economy has experienced substantial change in the 1990s.  Although 
the effective stabilization program finally ceased hyperinflation, the macroeconomic 
condition remained under high tension of vulnerability to external shocks.  Moreover, 
the structural reform with deregulation and trade liberalization provoked substantial 
                                                   
1 As one might recall, the original discussion of the terms of trade deterioration led to import substituting 
industrialization, then claims for dependence on foreign intermediate goods as the cause of external imbalance 
provoked argument for advancing import substitution, and unhappy net resource transfer to abroad as a form of debt 
service justified the moratorium.       
 change in rules of the market and the restitution of new market order is still 
underway.  This added further uncertainty in institutional aspect. 
This paper analyzes the source and determinants of uncertainties of the current 
Brazilian economy.  The next section concentrates on macroeconomic issues, followed 
by a section addressing the institutional changes.  The final section concludes the 
discussion.                         
 
II.  Problems of macroeconomic uncertainties 
 
Background 
Brazilian economy grew at annual average rate of 1.2% per capita in real term 
in the second half of the 20th century.  As Table 1 details the growth performance during 
the fifty years, stark contrast can be made between the first 30 years of sustained high 
growth (1950-80) growing constantly 4.3% per year and the last 20 years where the 
economy registered practically zero growth (0.4% annually).   
 
Table 1. Brazilian real GDP per capita growth during the second half of the 20th century 
Period 
Growth 
rate 
Period 
Growth 
rate 
1950-55  3,6% 1975-80  4,1%
1955-60  4,8% 1980-85  -0,8%
1960-65  1,3% 1985-90  0,1%
1965-70  5,0% 1990-95  1,5%
1970-75  7,0% 1995-2000  0,9%
 
(Source) IPEA Data (http://www.ipeadata.gov.br) 
 
The growth accounting in Figure 1 reveals that the high growth period was 
driven by active resource mobilization, with particularly strong correlation of growth of 
GDP and capital input.  Productivity growth was not very significant initially but started 
to be significant in early 1970s but dropped afterwards.  Import substituting 
industrialization (ISI) was made relatively successfully with consumer-durable goods 
such as automobile and electronics, the heavy capital investment in the 1970s to proceed 
to the second phase of ISI, including technology based industries such as informatics 
and upstream products such as petrochemical, never obtained economically viable scale 
because of the economic crisis in the 1980s.  This may partly explain the rise and fall of 
 the total factor productivity in Brazil.  The figure also shows that in the low 
growth period of the 1990s the productivity growth made com-movement with GDP 
growth, although low capital growth was responsible for the low level of GDP growth.  
This fact provides an open question whether internal efficiency was improved by 
productive restructuring by firms, or it has to do with ownership change (M&A and 
privatization).      
 
Figure 1. Factor decomposition of the growth of the Brazilian economy (1950-2000) 
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(Note) Total Factor Productivity (TFP) is by author’s own calculation based on the assumption of the Cobb-Douglaus 
production function with the labor income ratio of 0.4 and annual depreciation of 0.6.  Labor service was calculated 
multiplying the number of employed workers with estimated average yeas of schooling. 
  
(Source) IPEADATA for capital stock and real GDP.  Summers, Heston, and Atten, Penn World Table Mark 6.1 at 
<http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/> for number of workers and Human Capital Updated Files 
<http://www.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/ciddata.html> for the average year of schooling.  
 
In the high growth period, Brazil implemented extensive import substituting 
industrialization program.  The sizable domestic market was protected from competition 
with foreign products.  The developmental state style government constructed huge 
resource mobilization apparatus such as: state enterprises (CSN – National Steel 
Company, Embraer – Brazil Aeronautic Enterprise), natural resource monopoly 
(Petrobras, CVRD), public utility holding companies (Telebras <telecommunication> 
 and Eletrobras <electric power>), development bank (BNDES-National Bank for 
Economic and Social Development), and commercial banks (Banco do Brasil, Caixa 
Economia Federal, and local state banks).  Moreover, balanced national integration was 
pursued through the construction of Brasilia and development projects of the regional 
development agency (SUDENE, SUDAM).   
Although limited internal saving capacity could have been a bottleneck for 
such ambitious investment projects, the confidence level of the growth potential of the 
Brazilian economy was so high that it attracted abundant investment and finance from 
abroad.  There was thus mutually reinforcing relationship between favorable external 
evaluation and high degree of autonomy of the development policy.   
On the contrary, the unsatisfactory performance in last two decades can be 
characterized by a vicious circle of a loss of confidence imposing more and more tight 
external constraint and a loss of the autonomy.  After the Mexican balance of payment 
crisis in 1982, access to foreign savings was largely denied during the 1980s until the 
mid-1990s.  The weak capability to comply with external obligations led Brazil to look 
for rescue packages from the International Monetary Fund several times.  In the 1980s, 
the government was unable to conduct autonomous structural reform fitting to the new 
reality, although it was apparent that the overweight public sector was not sustainable 
due to the hard fiscal constraint.  The reluctance left Brazilians no other choice than 
inflationary financing (budget deficit with money printing), leading to hyperinflation 
despite of some ad-hoc attempts of price controls.   
This new situation brought tremendous uncertainties to Brazilian economy.  
Inflation destroyed relative price structure among goods and services and distorted the 
resource distribution.  Exchange rate had to be adjusted daily basis and it was hard to 
predict even a near future.   
On the other hand, the government’s maintenance of market protection policy 
let domestic industries remain under little threat of external competition.  This allowed 
firms to take defensive strategy of avoiding investment and longer utilization of capital 
goods, cost reduction by smaller variety and higher scale production, and high mark-up 
pricing.    
The reform plan of the Collor administration in 1990, including “elimination of 
fiscal deficits”, “trade liberalization” and “privatization”, was new for Brazil at that time.  
The list of import prohibition was eliminated and the import tariff was reduced.  The 
 National Privatization Plan (PND) predicted comprehensive transfer of ownership 
of government owned productive assets such as steel mils, petrochemical complex, and 
aircraft industry to the private sector.  Although the administration’s inflation 
stabilization program including confiscation of bank deposit and freezing of price and 
wage was complete failure, and the president was impeached in 1992 for his 
involvement in illegal drag money operation, their structural reform idea had lasting 
effect which was later inherited by the Cardoso administration.  The climate of 
uncertainties increased because of even intensified inflation and the liberalization and 
the privatization were changing the market condition and it was hard to predict how will 
be and should its ultimate shape. 
The FHC era was initiated with recovery of growth in 1995 induced by 
successful implementation of the stabilization policy – Real Plan which brought the 
annual four digit hyperinflation to one digit by means of quasi-fixed nominal exchange 
rate as an anchor of the monetary policy.  A direct effect was the surge of domestic 
demand because of the real income growth due to the end of inflationary tax and 
recovery of faith in local currency.  Thanks to the price stabilization, external finance 
returned to Brazil.  The access to foreign saving was important to maintain the quasi-
fixed exchange rate without loosing the foreign exchange reserve while the current 
account was in sizable deficit because of the surge of import.  
The external saving dependent stabilization was proved to be vulnerable to 
external shocks.  By the nature of the exchange rate control, deterioration of the balance 
of payments should be defended by raising the interest rate to stop the capital outflow 
and to curb the import growth.  For this end, interest rate was shot up several times 
above 40%, especially during the turmoil of the global emerging market financial crisis 
in 1997-99.  As seen in Figure 2, the loss of foreign reserve triggered interest rate hikes.  
This kind of policy response failed to restore the external imbalance in the late 1998 and 
the Real Plan had to be abandoned, paving the way to the floating exchange regime.     
At that systemic change, a resurgence of inflation was much afraid of.  Yet, the 
Central Bank successfully contained the inflationary pressure by establishing inflation targeting 
as a new monetary policy rule, and the Ministry of Finance perfectly combined forces by tight 
fiscal policy to generate sufficient primary budget surplus.  Brazil muddled through the crisis of 
1999 and there was a sign of strong recovery with investment and employment growth in late 
2000.   
 Growth rate 
(%) 
1995 2.8 
1996 1.2 
1997 1.9 
1998 -1.2 
1999 -0.5 
2000 3.0 
2001 0.2 
2002 0.2 
(Source) IPEA data. 
 
 
 
Table 2. Recent Economic Growth   Figure 2. Instability of interest rate              
 
 
However, the economic recovery plunged as the economic environment 
returned unfavorable with the countrywide serious electric power shortage for almost a 
year in 2001 and political uncertainty in the expectation of opposition party’s winning 
the presidential election in 2002 and predicted substantial change in economic policy.  
Net foreign capital inflow fluctuates quite sensitively to outsiders’ evaluation of country 
risks, which then has an effect on the country’s economic stability.  Thus, although 
Brazil’s macroeconomic confidence rose by the virtue of inflation stabilization, the 
country still has not got rid of vulnerability to external factors.   Notice that, in contrast 
to the previous hyperinflation period in which the government was virtually bankrupt 
and inflation accommodative monetary policy was taken, during the post-1999 crisis 
period inflation rate has been kept under control and the Brazilian government was truly 
committed to the compliance of the fiscal and monetary policy target agreed with the 
International Monetary Fund and its economic fundamentals were considered sound.  
Still, as Figure 3 shows, country risk premium (represented by the spread of C-bond, the 
most traded Brazilian external bond) makes up down swings, which, in turn caused 
great fluctuation to the capital inflow and contracted the level of liquidity in the 
domestic financial market, as partly evidenced by the opposite movement of the Sao 
Paulo Stock Market (BOVESPA) index.  The real sector performance is also strongly 
influenced by such unstable financial indexes (Figure 4).   
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 So, Brazil is doing their best to keep its house in order: then, who should 
be blamed and what can be done?  In the next section, we will pay attention to the 
perverse logic of current macroeconomic policy.            
 
Figure 3. Country risk and stock market index 
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(Source) IPEADATA 
 
Figure 4.  Industrial production index growth rate（12 months, ％） 
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Source of Vulnerability  
According to the research done by ECLAC (2002), external vulnerability of 
Latin American economy has been strengthened during the 1990s.  It is particularly 
noted that: (1) availability of domestic credit is strongly influenced by influx of external 
financing which fluctuate depending on the external factors than internal ones; and (2) 
fiscal policy behaved in a pro-cyclical way such that in a low growth phase 
 governments reduce fiscal expenditure to avoid the government debt / GDP ratio 
to rise.  The latter question amplifies vulnerability due to inability to implement anti-
cyclical macroeconomic policies to mitigate an impact of the external shocks.   
The success of the Real Plan, ironically, revealed that the public finance of 
Brazil had depended much on inflationary tax and substantial reform was required to 
establish sustainable balanced account.  The fall of primary fiscal surplus in 1994-98 
was alarming.  In this initial period of the FHC era, although some adjustments were 
done2, they were not enough to save the primary balance from turning into deficit in 
1996-98.  The situation was particularly worrisome in local government.  Besides, 
Figure 5 shows that public debt service burden almost doubled as a proportion to GDP 
in 1997-98 due to the sharp rise of interest rate, leading to the sharp rise of the public 
debt to GDP ratio as seen in Figure 6.  Thus, it was noticeable that the interest rate rise 
responding to external shocks was translated into public deficit which should be 
financed by additional issuance of debt.  Notice that these are domestic bond (Figure 7) 
assumed by local financial institutions.         
Obviously, increasing debt-GDP ratio was not sustainable and the Brazilian 
government had to face two major policy reforms.  One is to abandon the nominal 
exchange rate anchor in order to avoid the galloping interest rate to defend the exchange 
rate and international reserve.  At the same time, the government implemented bold 
structural reforms.  Most notably the government passed a constitutional amendment in 
1998 to reform the social security system and the Law of Fiscal Responsibility in 2000 
ruled at three administrative level (federal-state-municipal) compulsory commitment to 
fiscal goals, setting limits to personnel expenditure and debt contract.  These measures 
boosted the cash generating capacity with the return to the primary surplus.    
After the floating of the exchange rate, the domestic financial institutions 
demand that their yield would be linked to exchange rate to neutralize the exchange rate 
risk to which they are exposed in external funding.  The proportion of the public debt 
indexed to exchange rate has been increased considerably.  Any substantial depreciation 
of the real affects fiscal account through increase of interest payment and increases the 
necessity of the borrowing.  Any external shock leading to depreciation of the real 
should be concerned for two reasons: inflationary pressure and rising debt/GDP ratio.  
                                                   
2 There were initiatives such as collection of new tax (i.e. CPMF- Provisionary Financial Transaction Tax) and 
introduction of FEF-Fiscal Stability Fund to retain a part of the transfer to local government in the central 
government treasury, in addition to privatization of several public enterprises.  
 This gives the central bank a motive for raising interest rate, which, yet adds 
undesirable pressure to debt/GDP ratio.  Since higher indebtedness raise sensitiveness of 
foreign creditors, the government is induced to announce tighter fiscal policy to boost 
the debt payment capacity.  The pro-cyclicality of macroeconomic policy is thus 
institutionalized, as ECLAC (2002) points out, limiting autonomous reaction to external 
shocks.     
 
Figure 5 Fiscal balance and interest payment Figure 6. Evolution of the public debt  
(%GDP)       （%,GDP） 
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Figure 7 Evolution of external debt by holders  
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Vulnerability to external shocks  
 
20, 0
25, 0
30, 0
35, 0
40, 0
45, 0
50, 0
55, 0
60, 0
19
91
 0
1
19
91
 1
2
19
92
 1
1
19
93
 1
0
19
94
 0
9
19
95
 0
8
19
96
 0
7
19
97
 0
6
19
98
 0
5
19
99
 0
4
20
00
 0
3
20
01
 0
2
20
02
 0
1
 These arguments point to the basic problem of the current Brazilian 
economy.  Let us illustrate with a model depicted as Figure 8, which is a modified 
interpretation of Caballero (2000).  We take the following minimalist approach to 
attribute the vulnerability of an economy on two factors.  One is weak international 
financial links that constrain access to external financing especially when it is needed.  
The other is limited role of the domestic financial market whose credit creation policy is 
so conservative.   
Departing from the original Caballero (2000) model, we consider that the final 
credit taker is a government who needs liquidity to finance the current deficit by 
pledging the future fiscal surplus (S) based on its sovereign credibility.  We assume that 
the government will not borrow from the foreign creditors directly and only finance 
through the domestic financial market.  Although the government can be loaned directly 
in reality, this assumption is plausible in light of Figure 8 which demonstrates that the 
private external debt rose sharply while the public sector external debt stagnated in the 
1990s.   
Consider that foreign creditors depicted by F-curve lend money to the banking 
sector of this country at the international interest rate i* up to its asset value A/r, where 
A is the nominal value of the asset and r represents a country risk. The graph also 
expresses that since the international financial link is so weak that the foreign creditors 
will not supply credit more than A/r, which is regarded as the ultimate collateral.   
 
Figure 8  External finance constrained crisis model 
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 The domestic banking sector, in turn, lends this money to the government 
which has the financing requirement S.  No further financial demand exist beyond this 
amount, therefore the B-curve is vertical at this point.  Banks require interest rate 
premium upon i* as the reward for the financial intermediation.  We assume that the 
higher the predicted default risk, the higher the premium would be, and the smaller the 
amount of the future budget surplus that the government can pledge and accepted by the 
banks.  Therefore, the B-curve slopes downward.                   
In a normal situation where the country is sufficiently creditworthy, A/r>S, 
therefore there is enough external finance at point a with i*, satisfying the government’s 
financial need S at the interest rate margin corresponding to the distance between b and 
a.  Suppose, then, that, for whatever the reason3, the country risk of this country rise, 
becoming A/r’<S and shifting F-curve left-ward to F’.  If the domestic banks would 
believe that the external shock would not affect the government’s promise to comply 
with the future surplus creation of S, they would create additional credit to maintain 
point b.  However, conservative domestic banks will reduce the finance to the 
government in accordance to the availability of the external credit and require higher 
risk premium at point c.  The government, in turn, cannot fully finance S and should 
curtail a current fiscal expenditure, which may negatively affect economic growth. 
This simple model represents a perverse situation of the Brazilian economy.  
Due to the fiscal fragility with dependence on the external financing, coupled with the 
conservative decision of the domestic financial sector, the impact of the external shock 
is directly translated to the domestic interest rate.  Moreover, contrarily to the standard 
macroeconomic theory, the fiscal policy should become pro-cyclical because the 
government should take restrictive fiscal policy against the negative external shock.  
Thus, the country’s inability to take counter-cyclical macroeconomic policy will make it 
highly vulnerable to external shocks.   
Our result resembles to Razin and Sadka’s (2002) assertion on strong influence 
of external factors on Brazilian economy.  They assume that an economic growth 
depends on the growth of investment which is basically financed by external borrowing.  
The model results in two equilibriums: a good equilibrium with low risk premium, 
higher investment and higher growth and bad equilibrium with high risk premium, low 
                                                   
3 A reader can imagine the situation when the Brazil faced contagious effect from financial crises in Russia (1998) 
and Argentina (2001), or when the pre-election political uncertainty in 2002.  
 investment and doomed economic growth.  The authors argues that the switch 
from good to bad equilibrium may occur abruptly because the investment level critically 
depends on the pro-cyclical formation of external rating of country risk.  The gloomy 
fate of this story is no matter how well the government and the central bank get the 
economic fundamentals right, the crisis may come if external evaluators cannot believe 
and there is nothing that policy makers can do against that.  
Notice that occurrence of this problem depends crucially on the assumptions of 
the weak link with the international finance and the conservative domestic banks which 
will not create credit beyond the availability of external funding.  If these conditions are 
relaxed, then we will have positively smoothly sloping F-curve for y > A/r and vertical 
B-line on the pledged future surplus level S. This means that foreign creditors’ provision 
of finance will not be constrained to the level of the country’s current convertible asset.  
For this, there is strong need for structural measures to restore policy autonomy.  It is 
true that the restoration of policy autonomy and attaining the foreign creditors’ 
confidence cannot be done immediately.  As pointed out by Garcia (2002), an important 
transitory measure is to increase “exportability” of the economy, which stands for about 
14% of GDP although it has picked up from 8% in 1997.  This can be interpreted as the 
leftward shift of the F-curve of Figure 8, making the psychological border A/r less 
probable to bind in the event of small shocks.   As for the domestic financial market is 
concerned, reform should include maintenance of debt to GDP ratio at manageable level, 
increase domestic savings, and promote domestic financial intermediation by removing 
systemic obstacles such as tax system increasing the cost of financial transaction.       
 
III. Institutional changes and structural uncertainties 
 
This section analyzes instability of the current Brazilian economy from 
different angle.  The argument here is that the structural reform implanted in early 
1990s by the Collor administration and deepened by the Cardoso administration has 
changed the rule of the game of the industrial sector, and firms by and large adapted 
defensive strategy during the transitional period.    
 
Trade liberalization 
 
 Figure 9  Tariff reduction: 1986-2001 
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(Source) WTO, Brazil Trade Policy Review Secretary Report 1996 and 2000, Geneva and for 
1997-2001 figures ALCA net 
 
The process of trade liberalization was already launched in the late 1980s.  
According to Figure 9, the average import tariff was reduced from 51% in 1987 to 41% 
in 1988 and 36% in 1989.  It was further deepened in the beginning of the 1990s under 
the Fernando Collor Administration by which the average tariff was brought down 
below 20%, coupled with abolishment of the import prohibition of 1,300 items listed in 
the Annex C of the Tariff Code.  Tariff structure was also simplified as being shown by 
the decrease of standard deviation, implying reduction of the maximum tariff.   
Brazil adopted Mercosur common external tariff (CET) in 1995.  Initially, four 
categories of goods were excluded from immediate adherence to CET: sugar, 
automobile and its parts, capital goods, and informatics and telecommunication 
equipment.  For the latter two, gradual conversion to CET, by 2001 for capital goods 
and 2006 for informatics and telecommunication equipment, was initially scheduled.  
Sugar and automobile are administered under special regimes leaving room for future 
negotiations.   
As being hit by several emerging market financial crises, Mercosur countries 
agreed to levy 3% points of surcharge on most of items, increasing the average tariff 
from 12.6% in 1996 to 14.7% in 1997.  Although the surcharge was originally planned 
to go off by the end of 2000, it is still partly maintained after being slashed 1.5% point 
by 2002.  This makes the average tariff rate in recent years is higher than the 1995-96 
level, yet the standard deviation continued to decrease owing to the reduction of tariff 
 on capital goods as the consequence of its conversion to CET (14%) and further 
reduction to 5% in 2001 for those which are not manufactured in Brazil. 
Impact of the tariff reduction was rather dramatic.  According the Figure 10, 
imports had been contained through high tariff and undervalued exchange rate since the 
occurrence of the balance of payment crisis in early 1980s, mainly to generate the 
capacity to repay external debt.  The Real Plan introduced in 1994 brought strong local 
currency whose income effect coupled with the lowest tariff level in many decades 
boosted imports and created sizable amount of trade deficit.  The level of imports was 
more or less equalized after the exchange rate was floated.   
     
Figure 10  Exports and Imports 
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             (Source) IPEADATA 
 
Deregulation and internationalization of ownership 
Another important aspect of the institutional changes during the FHC era was a 
deregulation.  Most importantly, many public enterprises were privatized and 
investment opportunities were open to foreign capital.  Likewise the trade liberalization, 
privatization was put into practice under the Collor administration by launching the 
National Privatization Plan (Plano Nacional de Desestatizacao: PND) in 1990.  Cardoso 
administration amended the constitution to eliminate differentiation between national 
and foreign capital and opened formerly closed sectors such as distribution of gas, 
mineral exploration and extraction (including hydrocarbons), maritime coast liner and 
river and lake transport, telecommunication services, financial services, and reinsurance 
operations.  Then the original PND was reformed with the approval of the Law No. 
9491 of 1997 to add these sectors.  As a related legal reform the Concession Law (Law 
 No. 8987 of 1995) institutionalize a general rule of the provision of concession of 
public service, complemented by the Law No. 9074 of 1995 for the electric power and 
Law No. 9295 of 1996 for a mobile telephone, and Law No. 9472 of 1997 (General Law 
of Telecommunication) for fixed telephone service.  As for the banking sector, many 
banks were in deficit after the loss of the float revenue by the end of high inflation.  The 
central bank had to make intervention to badly managed banks to consolidate the 
soundness of the financial system.  These bad banks were recapitalized and cleaned the 
balance sheets, and then merged with, and acquired by other healthier banks.  Such 
operation were initiated for private banks by PROER and then extended to state owned 
banks by PROES.  In this process, foreign banks played major role as acquires.     
 Table 3 illustrates this profound ownership structure change.  Among the large 
industries listed in the Gazeta Mercantil’s Balanco Annual, the share of the government 
decreased from 52.4% to 33.8% in capital in equity and from 48.7% to 22.9% in net 
operational revenue in ten years between 1990-2000.  On the other hand, both foreign 
companies and private national companies increased their share, while the increase was 
much more remarkable for the foreign companies. 
 
Figure 11  Net Foreign Direct Investment Inflow 
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Table 3  Shares of state, foreign capital and national private  
Shareholders' 
equity 
 Net operational 
revenue  
  1990 2000 1990 2000 
State 52.4 33.8 48.7 22.9 
Foreign 8.5 21.0 10.1 27.9 
Private 39.1 45.2 41.2 49.2 
(Source) Gazeta Mercantil, Balanco Annual. 
 
 De Paula, Ferraz, and Iootty (2002) explains that under the trade 
liberalization and increasing presence of multinationals in the domestic market, 
Brazilian enterprises found themselves under-capitalized and lacking the technology 
necessary to maintain local market share and enter international markets.  Then the 
financial fragility forced a large number of firms either to seek new partners or to sell-
off assets to new entrants.  Thus, the in the last decade the Brazilian industry witnessed 
major ownership change  
Kupfer and Rocha (2002) showed that the participation of multinational firms 
increased in every sector.  It does not necessarily mean, however that the Brazilian 
market was captured by foreign companies and it became less competitive.  On the 
contrary, Kupfer and Rocha (2002) showed that as the result of the break down of the 
state monopoly in several sectors and survival of local companies through defensive 
specialization strategy, the intensity of market competition actually has increased.  In 
some sectors national private enterprises achieved notable growth through acquisitions.  
 
Diversified reactions 
It is still an open question whether this ownership structure change has led to 
expansion of productive capacity and improvement of technology at each industry level.  
Although it requires careful an in depth analyses, Ferraz, Iootty, and Kupfer (2003) 
analyzed the recent trend of investment and reached the following conclusion.  There 
were some capacity expansion investment but specialization to limited type of 
production and market consolidation through M&A was widely seen.  In general, 
interest in innovation has been low, with just one third of firms investing in any kind of 
innovative activities.  Larger firms were more likely to innovate.  Some sector specific 
characteristics were observed: 
<Durable consumer goods> In automobile and parts, investment in capacity 
expansion and modernization of existing capacity of automobile assembly 
makers and consolidation in autoparts firms through M&A.  In electronics, 
capacity expanded toward 1996, then most recently the sector concentrates in 
specialization and consolidation.  M&A occurred and promoted concentration in 
home electrical appliances. 
<Capital goods> Generally weakened competitiveness after the market 
liberalization.  Telecommunication equipment industry expanded after the 
 deregulation of the telecommunication sector.  Some multinationals entered the 
market through M&A which now has dominant position.  Other industrial 
equipment industry did not invest. 
<Intermediate goods> In both steel industry and petrochemical industry, 
privatization marked a process of asset ownership restructuring, which is not 
concluded yet and larger scale of consolidation is expected.  Some investments 
were made for production of more noble line of products. 
<Non-durable consumer goods> Footwear industry, export-oriented, made a 
scrap-and-build investment shifting production base to low wage area to gain 
competitiveness and maintained the production level.  Such cost-effectiveness 
strategy was common to some extent for textile, but the latter lost production 
capacity due to the lack of competitiveness having obsolete technology. 
In order to follow this characterization numerically, we constructed Table 5 
and 6 from firm accounting data published in Gazeta Mercantil’s  Balanço Anual.  
Unlike Ferraz, Iootty, and Kupfer (2003), our data is not restricted to the manufacturing.  
Table 4 reports the evolution of total asset during 1994-2001.  Based on this data we 
calculated increments of the total asset in two periods, 1994-98 and 1999-2001, 
corresponding to periods of controlled exchange rate and the floating regime.  The total 
increments during the whole years are divided by the initial position in 1994 and the 
sectors are sorted by this index to identify the ranking of investment performance.  
Table 5 was thus created.  Table 6 shows the evolution of profitability (net profit to 
equity ratio).  
Table 5 identifies that home electric appliances, telecommunication, food, 
retail and petroleum & gas are most highly ranked sectors in investment performance in 
the 1990s.   Among these, telecommunication and petroleum & gas are noticeable in 
terms of the volume of increments in asset.  The high performance of the two sectors 
was a result of deregulation.  Privatization of fixed telephone and mobile phone service 
formerly owned by Telebras, as well as the auction of the concession of so-called mirror 
providers (competitors in each privatized service area) were implemented in 1998.  
Petrobras has not been privatized but its monopoly over petroleum and natural gas was 
opened to competition.  This resulted in not only new entrants’ investment in petroleum 
exploration and distribution of fuels but also conveyed Petrobras itself to more 
aggressive finance and investment strategy.  Home electric appliance industry, food 
 industry, and retail service were marked by significant number of acquisition of 
local brands by foreign firms enlarging market share in the Brazilian market.   
Among the middle-high investment performance sectors with the index above 
the average, holding companies and banks were also driven by M&A including foreign 
investment4.  It should be noted that the recent M&A wave gave rise to many holding 
companies controling horizontal conglomerates, such as the case of AmBev resulted 
from the merger of Brahma and Antarctica.     
In the following groups, the lower performance of the electric power sector 
noticeable, especially when it is compared with the telecommunication sector that also 
experienced privatization.  It is commonly said that the privatization of the electric 
power did not contribute to investment increase5.  
It should be also noted that, according to our indicators, technology intensive 
sectors such as informatics & information technology, electronics, and automobile were 
comparatively lower profile in invest performance.  Consumer non-durables were 
differentiated between food and leather & shoes (high), beverage & tobacco (middle), 
and textile and furniture (low). 
From Table 6, the following relevant observations can be drawn with regard to 
profitability:  
(1) Among the high investment performance group, bank, leather & 
shoes, petroleum, and pharmaceuticals continuously show high 
profitability6.  Retail service and home electric appliance, and 
telecommunication apparently suffered a negative impact of low 
economic growth in the post-devaluation period. 
(2) Although not being outstanding in the investment performance, 
sanitary products, beverage & tobacco, mining, and non-metallic 
mineral products showed high profitability throughout the recent 
years. 
(3) Electronics and informatics & IT were influenced by the downturn 
of the telecommunication sector as being the main client.  Electric 
                                                   
4 Another notable feature in this group is the quite contrasting performance of the construction industry before and 
after the exchange rate system change. 
5 This problem is analyzed by Hamaguchi (2002). 
6 Banks’ negative profit in 1996 was influenced by a large loss of Banco do Brasil in that year.  If we consider only 
private (national & foreign) banks, the profitability was 0.157. 
 equipment picked up in 2000-01 owing to the temporary 
surge of demand for power generation and energy saving 
equipment after the power shortage in 2000.  
(4) Profitability of automobile7 (including other transport equipment 
such as air craft) and paper & cellulose, and metal is recovering 
after the devaluation, partly due to higher exportability.   
(5)  Low profitability coincides with low investment performance in 
such sectors as agribusiness related ones (agriculture and livestock, 
sugar and alcohol), plastic & rubber, and wood & furniture.   
    
To summarize, we could confirm the argument by Ferraz, Iootty, and Kupfer 
(2003) regarding the discordance of the investment trend by sectors.  Thus, it cannot be 
said that the macroeconomic uncertainty covering the whole economy affect all sectors 
uniformly.  It is therefore important to take into consideration impact of institutional 
changes that may overwhelm the macroeconomic effect.  Deregulation of unfulfilled 
demand and unexplored resource, such as the case of telecommunication (the former 
case) and petroleum & gas (the latter case) is certainly investment enhancing, although 
macroeconomic effect is becoming increasingly dominant in the case of 
telecommunication in the recent scenario.  Otherwise, as the leather and shoe industry 
demonstrates, high degree of export orientation makes the sector rather prone to 
economic fluctuation in the domestic market.  Having these exceptional cases, 
combination of macroeconomic and institutional uncertainties is conductive to 
defensive concentration.  Consider that an expected shock is symmetric; i.e. fluctuation 
is expected but there are equal chances of good times and bad times in the future.  In 
this case, by eliminating competition a dominant firm can capture the expanded market 
taking advantage of scale economy to deter entry of new competitors.  In the bad times, 
the firm can avoid a war of price reduction and assure a profit.  The interpretation leads 
us to understand the recent M&A boom in Brazil not as aiming at short-term 
monopolistic rent or as means to earn capital gains, but as a long-term strategy to cope 
with uncertainties of the economy.  Whether the productive capacity expands still 
depends on the macroeconomic prospects but the institutional changes have promoted 
                                                   
7 The figure of the automobile sector cannot be considered representative because most of principal assemblers in the 
Brazilian market (Volkswagen, GM, Ford, Daimler Chrysler) are not reported in the original data source. 
 deep capital ownership restructuring in a number of sectors.  Should a policy can 
enhance economic autonomy, it will enable to reduce external constraint contributing to 
sustained growth.       
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
This paper raised the question about the meaning of uncertainty for the current 
Brazilian economy.  We first examined that economic growth has been doomed despite 
the achievement of price stability under the Fernando Henrique Cardoso administration.  
This was mainly due to low growth of capital stock which had been the main engine for 
the past fifty years.  As the aggregate investment theory showed, investment might be 
discouraged by macroeconomic uncertainty.  As sources of economic uncertainty, we 
paid particular attention to the fact that: (1) external financial linkage is weak; and (2) 
domestic financial market is shallow and conservative.  With these factors sudden 
interest rate hike is likely under external shocks and the question of vulnerability is 
structural because of the lack of ability to implement anti-cyclical fiscal policy. 
Although the stagnation of capital stock increase is observed at macro-level, 
we call attention to the fact that the trend of investment is discordance by sectors.  This 
fact is attributable to heterogeneous impact of institutional reform and further 
uncertainties brought by the reform.  The recent M&A wave is probably related to such 
economic environment. 
Our analysis left many unanswered questions.  Firstly, we did not discuss the 
impact of uncertainties on productivity and labor, being particularly important the case 
of the former and its relation to profitability.  It is also of interest how uncertainty 
affects innovative activity of firms.  Secondly, the issues of firm strategy should be 
more carefully discussed.  Uncertainty should increase idiosyncrasy of firms’ reaction, 
which in turn change the sectoral structure.  Thirdly, the relation between uncertainties 
and concentration of ownership should be examined with more theoretical rigor.  This, 
then, will pave the way to a question of impact of concentration on productivity and 
profitability, related to the first question above.   Finally, the role of export is important 
for the policy analysis.  Our analysis suggested that higher degree of export would make 
an industry less vulnerable and more conductive to investment.  It was also pointed out 
that higher exportability would all wider slack of external finance constraint and reduces 
 the macro-level vulnerability.  This should be however contrasted with the view 
on vulnerability on high dependence on external demand, like the debate on the case on 
Chile and Mexico suggests.           
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 Table 4 Evolution of total asset by sectors  (Unit: R$ billion) 
Total Asset 1994 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Petroleum & Gas     30.30  44.43 47.74 50.68 65.02 87.99 98.58 
Automobile & parts     11.32  15.23 17.15 19.61 25.08 26.21 18.70 
Metal     41.40  51.48 53.95 55.55 73.50 80.59 87.14 
Chemical & Petrochemical     22.08  26.55 30.79 32.13 39.99 46.46 49.64 
House electric appliances       2.10  3.50 3.74 6.59 4.38 8.55 10.68 
Informatics & IT       5.33  3.68 3.13 5.75 6.91 9.43 9.23 
Paper & Cellulose     13.40  22.60 20.71 20.98 26.88 30.37 32.60 
Mining     17.02  22.06 23.03 24.84 26.19 30.86 35.67 
Textile     10.08  14.90 13.32 12.43 14.14 16.44 16.56 
Non-metallic mineral products     13.51  17.81 16.47 18.28 20.90 24.97 21.86 
Machinery       5.46  7.97 6.79 7.57 9.68 9.72 11.57 
Sanitary & cleaning product       2.48  1.87 3.20 4.74 6.37 7.04 5.31 
Electric equipment       2.62  3.71 5.71 6.75 7.07 5.07 6.20 
Pharmaceutics       2.32  2.70 2.51 4.12 6.26 6.42 6.19 
Plastic & rubber       3.74  4.68 4.16 4.47 7.01 6.94 7.01 
Electronics       4.46  12.91 12.71 14.23 17.24 11.18 7.64 
Leather and shoes       1.46  2.12 1.78 2.51 2.69 3.40 3.87 
Wooden products & furniture       4.21  6.65 6.66 7.12 9.24 6.58 7.08 
Electric power     95.36  147.12 126.21 163.39 176.59 168.30 210.60 
Telecommunication     26.96  45.04 50.13 64.49 77.64 105.95 119.64 
Transportation & logistics     50.59  76.75 71.94 73.81 65.11 72.15 74.19 
Construction     25.94  50.46 61.46 69.11 68.04 78.43 78.26 
Retail       7.00  15.03 14.88 18.64 22.72 23.57 23.74 
Wholesale       4.95  6.08 6.56 8.67 5.75 18.51 7.64 
Food       9.24  17.27 17.50 19.89 25.76 33.56 37.01 
Beverage & tobacco     10.03  16.94 16.11 18.79 21.89 25.76 21.59 
Sugar / alcohol       9.20  14.36 8.09 13.33 14.55 18.72 19.35 
Agriculture       7.01  6.16 7.66 13.19 11.16 6.95 7.85 
Livestock       6.19  9.20 7.98 8.57 9.83 5.49 6.70 
Banks   401.20  575.92 679.92 771.01 842.67 970.56 1107.16 
Holding   140.92  210.83 188.27 249.77 307.68 369.47 404.43 
 
(Source) Gazeta Mercantil, Balanço Anual, various yeras. 
  
Table 5  Ranking of investment 
Increments 
Total Asset 
1994-1998 1998-2001 
1994-2001 
(A) 
(A)/(Position 
in 1994) 
Ave=1.574 
Home electric appliances 4.49 4.09 8.58 4.09 
Telecommunication 37.53 55.14 92.67 3.44 
Food 10.65 17.12 27.78 3.01 
Retail 11.64 5.1 16.73 2.39 
Petroleum & Gas 20.38 47.9 68.28 2.25 
Construction 43.17 9.16 52.33 2.02 
Holding 108.85 154.66 263.5 1.87 
Banks 369.81 336.16 705.97 1.76 
Pharmaceutics 1.8 2.07 3.87 1.67 
Leather and shoes 1.05 1.37 2.42 1.66 
Paper & Cellulose 7.58 11.63 19.2 1.43 
Electric equipment 4.13 -0.54 3.58 1.37 
Chemical & Petrochemical 10.06 17.5 27.56 1.25 
Electric power 68.03 47.21 115.25 1.21 
Beverage & tobacco 8.75 2.8 11.55 1.15 
Sanitary & cleaning product 2.26 0.58 2.84 1.15 
Machinery 2.11 4 6.11 1.12 
Metal 14.15 31.59 45.73 1.10 
Sugar / alcohol 4.13 6.03 10.15 1.10 
Mining 7.82 10.84 18.66 1.10 
Plastic & rubber 0.74 2.54 3.28 0.88 
Informatics & IT 0.42 3.48 3.9 0.73 
Electronics 9.77 -6.59 3.18 0.71 
Wood products & furniture 2.91 -0.04 2.87 0.68 
Automobile & parts 8.29 -0.91 7.38 0.65 
Texstile 2.35 4.13 6.48 0.64 
Non-metallic mineral products 4.77 3.58 8.35 0.62 
Wholesale 3.72 -1.02 2.7 0.55 
Transportation & logistics 23.22 0.38 23.6 0.47 
Agriculture 6.18 -5.34 0.84 0.12 
Livestock 2.38 -1.87 0.51 0.08 
 
   
Table 6.  Profitability (Net profit / shareholder’s equity) 
Profitability 1994 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Petroleum & Gas 0,12 0,05 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,31 0,28 
Automobile & parts 0,20 -0,02 -0,01 -0,01 0,12 0,06 0,15 
Metal 0,05 0,00 0,02 -0,02 -0,04 0,13 0,06 
Chemical & Petrochemical 0,08 0,00 0,01 0,05 0,02 0,07 0,04 
Home electric appliances 0,13 0,17 0,04 0,01 -0,13 -0,06 -0,08 
Informatics & IT 0,16 0,01 0,09 0,04 0,04 -0,03 -0,33 
Paper & Cellulose 0,05 -0,05 -0,04 -0,07 0,03 0,13 0,07 
Mining 0,07 0,05 0,07 0,08 0,08 0,16 0,18 
Textile 0,11 -0,04 -0,04 -0,05 -0,05 0,03 -0,01 
Non-metallic mineral products 0,08 0,08 0,04 0,04 0,06 0,12 0,17 
Machinery 0,07 -0,02 0,06 0,02 -0,03 0,04 0,06 
Sanitary & cleaning product 0,25 0,15 0,13 0,07 0,15 0,11 0,10 
Electric equipment 0,07 -0,02 0,11 0,07 -0,09 0,08 0,20 
Pharmaceutics 0,30 0,29 0,19 0,19 0,17 0,07 0,06 
Plastic & rubber 0,08 -0,04 -0,02 -0,07 -0,05 0,00 -0,06 
Electronics 0,17 0,10 0,09 -0,01 -0,16 0,08 -0,65 
Leather and shoes 0,16 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,04 0,10 0,09 
Wooden products & furniture 0,02 0,02 0,00 0,00 -0,08 0,03 -0,01 
Electric power 0,01 -0,01 0,03 0,02 -0,03 0,00 0,02 
Telecommunication 0,04 0,09 0,10 0,06 -0,03 0,01 -0,05 
Transportation & logistics -0,05 -0,03 -0,07 0,06 -0,07 -0,09 -0,10 
Construction 0,04 0,05 0,03 0,04 0,04 0,04 0,04 
Retail 0,10 0,13 0,06 0,08 0,03 0,03 0,04 
Wholesale 0,15 0,09 0,03 0,08 0,02 0,12 0,06 
Food 0,11 0,02 -0,03 0,05 0,01 -0,01 0,03 
Beverage & tobacco 0,11 0,15 0,11 0,13 0,03 0,15 0,15 
Sugar / alchool 0,07 -0,04 -0,02 -0,03 -0,07 -0,01 0,07 
Agriculture 0,01 -0,04 0,00 0,09 -0,11 -0,01 -0,01 
Livestock 0,04 -0,01 0,03 0,01 -0,04 0,02 -0,03 
Banks 0,09 -0,03 0,11 0,08 0,04 0,10 0,09 
Holding 0,05 0,05 0,08 0,03 0,01 0,05 0,03 
(Source) Gazeta Mercantil, Balanço Anual, various yeras. 
 
